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Security After the 2010 Pakistan Floods: 
Insights from the South Asian Experience
PAUL DOROSH, SOHAIL J. MALIK, and MARIKA KRAUSOVA
The 2010 floods in Pakistan had a devastating effect on the Pakistani population. This 
paper summarises recovery experiences from previous natural disasters in South Asia, including 
the 2005 earthquake in Pakistan and the 1998 flood in Bangladesh, and suggests several lessons 
relevant for recovery efforts following the 2010 Pakistan flood. First, market and trade policies 
should maintain adequate price incentives so that private trade and imports can contribute to post-
disaster recovery. Second, a strong institutional framework is needed to coordinate the large-scale 
disaster response. Third, recovery efforts should also include support for livelihood security and 
restoration, ensuring inclusion of the stakeholders. Fourth, restoring and upgrading infrastructure 
facilities can lead to enhanced flood resistance as well as a reduction in future disaster loss. Two 
alternative institutions may be possible vehicles for poverty-alleviation—the Pakistan Poverty 
Alleviation Fund (PPAF) and the Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP). To address future 
disasters, however, it is important to establish and strengthen disaster response capability, 
including applying lessons learned from the relief and rehabilitation response to the 2010 floods. 
JEL classification: Q18,
Keywords: Pakistan, Floods, Post-disaster Recovery and Rehabilitation, Food 
       Security
1.   INTRODUCTION
The 2010 floods in Pakistan, which began in the northern part of the country in late 
July and gradually spread south along the Indus River basin in August, were devastating in 
terms of the loss of life and other damage.  As of early September, 1,677 flood-related deaths 
had occurred, and by one estimate, $6.5 billion worth of damage to crops, housing, other 
buildings, roads, and irrigation infrastructure had been incurred [OCHA (2010)]. Moreover, 
there remain serious concerns about rural livelihoods in heavily flooded areas with damaged 
infrastructure, potential problems with planting of the rabi (winter) crop if flood waters are 
slow to recede, the spread of water-borne disease, and absence of  food security for the poor.
There is an increasing consensus that flood recovery and rehabilitation efforts have to 
take a multi-sector development approach. Severe floods affect not only the country’s 
infrastructure but also the education, health, water and sanitation, transportation, 
communications, agricultural, trade, and industrial sectors. Though the differences between 
the current Pakistan flood and other floods in Pakistan and elsewhere in South Asia are many, 
one can nevertheless glean important insights from other experiences, particularly the 
massive flood in Bangladesh in 1998. The designs and evaluations of past flood prevention 
and rehabilitation projects in Pakistan and elsewhere in South Asia can also suggest useful 
approaches to an effective response to the 2010 floods.
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In this paper, we group these lessons into four broad categories: market and trade 
policies; institutional framework and sources of financing; livelihood support programmes 
and welfare transfers; and rehabilitation of agriculture and infrastructure. We summarise the 
major insights that may be relevant to Pakistan’s post-flood rehabilitation efforts. We also 
look at the existing national and sub-national authorities involved in disaster management as 
well as other possible mechanisms by which disaster rehabilitation funds and efforts can be 
channelled. We discuss their possible roles in the delivery of poverty-alleviating 
interventions and resources. In the final part of the paper, we address the implementation 
challenges that can hinder the stakeholders’ ability to undertake the reconstruction and 
rehabilitation efforts.
The following section presents a brief overview of the 2010 Pakistan flood, 
highlighting the effects of the flood on agriculture and food security. Section 3 discusses 
other floods in South Asia, focusing on research and policy insights, as well as lessons from 
the experience of other flood relief and rehabilitation projects. Section 4 provides a brief 
description of Pakistani institutions that may play a key role in flood rehabilitation. The last 
section gives a brief summary of the findings.
2. THE 2010 PAKISTAN FLOODS: DAMAGE AND THREATS TO 
AGRICULTURE AND FOOD SECURITY
The 2010 Pakistan floods are the direct result of extraordinarily heavy monsoon rains 
in July and August, though other factors, including deforestation in upland areas and 
inadequate drainage, have played a role as well. The floods have affected far more people 
(18.7 million) than other recent natural disasters in Pakistan such as the October 2005 
Pakistan earthquake (3.5 million), the Nargis cyclone of May 2008 (2.4 million), or the 
December 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami (2.3 million) (Table 1). The number of deaths (about 
1,700 people), however, was far lower than from the 2005 earthquake (about 73,300 people) 
or the tsunami (about 230,000 people).
In comparison with other recent floods, the 2010 flood has displaced far more people, 
about 18 million; this is more than four times the number of people displaced by the 1992 
1
flood (about 4 million), which was the next largest Pakistan flood since 1985 (Figure 1).  
Floods in other parts of South Asia, especially in Bangladesh and India, often displace far 
greater numbers of people. The total number of displaced people due to floods in South Asia 
has exceeded 20 million people in six of the past 25 years. Moreover, as Table 2 shows, the 
floods have caused very substantial economic losses. Those include losses of 
nonagricultural businesses ($0.3 billion) and housing ($3.6 billion) in both rural and urban 
areas as well as damage to agricultural and nonagricultural infrastructure (not included in the 
table).
Other recent floods in Pakistan affected wider areas than did the 2010 flood even 
though they displaced fewer people. As Figure 2 shows, floods in 1992, 2003, and 2005 each 
affected more than 400,000 square kilometers, as compared to less than 200,000 square 
2
kilometers for the Pakistan flood of 2010.
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See Appendix A for a summary of major floods in Pakistan from 1985 to 2010.
2
One reason for the greater number of displaced people in 2010 is that heavy floods this year have 
inundated urban areas. The increase over time in the number of people who have settled in the katcha areas (areas 
alongside the banks of canals and rivers) is another factor. 
  
Flood Earthquake 
Katrina 
Cyclone 
Nargis 
Cyclone 
Tsunami  
Pakistan Pakistan USA Myanmar 
Indian 
Ocean 
(Aug. 
2010) 
(Oct. 
 2005) 
(Aug. 
2005) 
(May 
2008) 
(Dec. 
2004) 
Population Affected 
(Million) 
18.7* 3.5 0.5 2.4 2.3 
Area Affected 
(Thousand sq. km.)  
132* 30  23  
Deaths  1,677* 73,338 1,836 84,537 230,000 
Injured  2,605* 128,309  19,359 125,000 
Households Damaged 
(Million) 
1.25* 0.60  0.45  
Estimated Economic 
Damage (Billion US$) 
6.5** 5.2 125.0 4.0 7.8 
 
Table 1
Pakistan 2010 Flood Comparison with Other Recent Natural Disasters
Sources: * Relief Web (2010): Information as of September 4, 2010; ** Authors’ estimates based on area data from  
OCHA (2010).
As Table 2 shows, the damage to agricultural crops, livestock, irrigation systems, and 
infrastructure has been substantial, though it has varied across regions due to differences in 
agroecology and other factors. Most of Pakistan’s agriculture is concentrated in the Indus 
River basin, the world’s largest irrigation network, and is irrigated through an extensive 
canal system, often supplemented with groundwater (typically pumped with small-scale 
3
tube wells).  The floods have caused extensive damage in these regions to the major 
monsoon season (kharif) crops: basmati rice in northern Punjab and cotton in southern 
Punjab and northern Sindh. In the generally hilly and mountainous regions of the northern 
province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (formerly North-West Frontier Province) and similar non-
3
See World Bank (2007) for a recent succinct review of Pakistan’s agricultural sector.
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Fig. 1. Major Floods in South Asia: Population Displaced
Source: Dartmouth Flood Observatory (2010).
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 Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa 
Rural 
Punjab 
Rural 
Sindh 
Rural 
Balochistan 
Rural 
All 
Pakistan 
Urban  
All 
Pakistan 
Total  
Agroecology Barani 
Barani 
(Mainly in 
North) and 
Canal 
Irrigated 
Canal 
Irrigated Barani 
  
Major Crops  
Wheat, 
Maize 
Wheat, 
Rice, 
Sugarcane, 
Cotton 
Wheat, 
Rice, 
Sugarcane, 
Cotton 
Wheat, 
Rice 
  
Impact of Floods*             
Deaths 1,121 103 151 48 —  1,677  
Injured 1,165 350 845 98 —  2,605  
Houses Damaged 
(Thousands) 
192 500 470 75 —  1,248  
Population Affected  
(Million)* 
4.3 8.2 4.7 1.0 —  18.3  
Crop Area Affected 
(Thousands Ha) 
443 1,516 998 627 —  3,676  
Flood Damage by 
Type (Million 
US$)** 
      
Crops  192 1,658 838 
233                      
269 
—                        
—  
2,957  
Livestock 65 — 233 144 —  441  
Residential Property  1,151 828 
—                        
84 
—                        
81 
—               
1,491  
3,634  
Nonagricultural 
Establishments  
— — — 13 220  233  
Nonagricultural 
Equipment 
— — — 2 60  62  
Total Damages 1,371 2,031 873 509 1,771  6,555  
 
Table 2
Impact of the 2010 Floods
Source: * OCHA (2010) as of September 4, 2010; ** Authors’ estimates based on area data from OCHA (2010).
Notes: Crop area is defined as land of which at least 60 percent is cultivated. Barani: nonirrigated. Totals for             
Pakistan include Azad Jammu and Kashmir, and Gilgit-Baltistan.
Fig. 2. South Asia Major Floods: Area Affected
Source: Dartmouth Flood Observatory (2010).
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4Note that in Bangladesh, the winter season crop of rice following a major monsoon season flood has 
typically been much larger than in preceding years, most likely due to a combination of improved price incentives 
and deposits of nutrient-rich sediments [del Ninno, et al. (2001)].
5
The 2007–08 HIES is a nationally and province level representative survey of 15,453 households 
covering information about households’ income and expenditures. The HIES also includes detailed information 
about households’ crop and livestock production, consumption and expenditures which enable the calculation of 
household level crop land productivity levels for individual provinces.
irrigated (barani) areas of northern Punjab, most of the agricultural land is not irrigated. 
Here, the floods have also caused substantial damage to maize and other crops.
Pakistan’s most important food staple, wheat, is cultivated in the winter season 
(rabi), in the barani areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and northern Punjab as well as in the 
irrigated Indus River basin areas of northern Sindh. How the floods will affect the rabi wheat 
crop, to be planted in October through early December, remains uncertain. In some areas, 
floodwaters may have deposited sediments that add to soil fertility and thus may actually 
lead to increased yields. Wheat cultivation in other areas could suffer, however, due to 
damage to irrigation infrastructure and roads, as well as farmers’ losses of seeds, tools, and 
4
machinery.  Further south, in southern Sindh, drainage problems limit cotton cultivation and 
the warm nighttime temperatures make the area unsuitable for wheat cultivation. Here, 
ordinary (nonaromatic) rice is cultivated as a rabi crop. The other major crop in Pakistan, 
sugarcane, is grown almost exclusively on irrigated land and typically remains in the field 
nine to 15 months.
The 2010 floods caused extensive damage to monsoon season (kharif) crops, mainly 
cotton, rice, sugarcane and vegetables, which were still standing in the fields in August and 
early September. In August, OCHA and FAO estimated the crop area damaged at 3.58 
million hectares (Table 3). Though the flooding initially began in the northern parts of the 
country, particularly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the crop area affected (400,000 hectares) in 
those less densely populated, hilly areas was far smaller than in the more densely populated 
and more intensively cultivated, (mainly) irrigated Punjab (1.5 million hectares). 
In October, the Pakistan Agricultural Research Council (NRD-PARC) released their 
own independent estimates of the crop area damaged by the floods. The total estimated crop 
area affected was sharply lower than the initial OCHA estimates of 3.6 million hectares: 1.3 
million hectares [NRD-PARC (2010)]. Subsequently, on October 30, the World Bank, Asian 
Development Bank and the Food and Agriculture Organisation [World Bank/ADB/FAO 
(2010)] released the results of the Pakistan Flood Damage and Needs Assessment estimating 
the crop area damaged at 2.1 million hectares resulting in the loss of 7.5 million tons of 
sugarcane, 2.5 million tons of rice, 0.8 million tons of vegetables, 0.7 million tons of cotton 
and 0.3 million tons of maize. As seen in Table 3, compared to the early September 2010 
OCHA estimates, the October 2010 estimates for crop area damaged dropped most sharply 
for Balochistan—from 628 thousand (OCHA) to only 74 to 132 thousand hectares (NRD-
PARC and WB/ADB/FAO). For Sindh, estimates of crop area damaged fell from 999 
thousand hectares (OCHA) to only 362 thousand hectares (NRD-PARC), but increased to 
1.04 million hectares in the WB/ADB/FAO estimates. Area damage estimates changed less 
for Punjab and KPK, but even in these cases the NRD-PARC and WB/ADB/FAO estimates 
of October 2010 were less than half the early September OCHA estimates. 
Alternative estimates of the flood damage to crops were constructed using household 
survey data from the 2007–08 Pakistan Household Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES; 
5
Table 4) and the initial OCHA figures for area damaged.  Assuming a 20 percent loss in crop 
output, and using the mean crop land productivity by province from the HIES, the value of 
171Rehabilitating Agriculture and Promoting Food Security After the 2010 Pakistan Floods
  Date of 
Estimate 
Province  
  KPK Punjab Sindh Balochistan Pakistan 
Crop Area 
Damaged 
(Thousands Ha) 
      
OCHA/FAO 4-Sep-10 443 1,517 999 628 3,676 
NRD-PARC 15-Oct -10 169 953 362 74 1,558 
WB/ADB/FAO 30-Oct -10 121 746 1,043 132 2,093 
Crop  Losses  
(Billion US$) 
      
IFPRI 4-Sep-10 0.19 1.66 0.84 0.23 2.96 
NRD-PARC 15-Oct -10 0.35 1.01 0.64 0.15 2.15 
WB/ADB/FAO 30-Oct -10 0.28 1.75 2.11 0.26 5.04 
Livestock Damage  
(Billion US$) 
      
IFPRI 4-Sep-10 0.07  0.23 0.14 0.44 
WB/ADB/FAO 30-Oct -10 0.11 0.09 0.19 0.17 0.57 
Total Agriculture 
Damage (Billion 
US$)  
     
IFPRI 4-Sep-10 0.26 1.66 1.07 0.37 3.40 
WB/ADB/FAO 30-Oct -10 0.40 1.84 2.30 0.43 5.04* 
 
Table 3
Alternative Estimates of the 2010 Pakistan Flood Impact on Agriculture
Source: OCHA (September 4, 2010), NRD-PARC (October 15, 2010), IFPRI (September, 4, 2010), 
WB/ADB/FAO (October 31, 2010). 
Notes: IFPRI calculations based on crop area damaged data from OCHA (2010); WB/ADB/FAO and IFPRI totals 
of crop area damaged and crop loss estimates include AJK and Gilgit-Baltistan; *WB/ADB/FAO Total 
agriculture damage includes fisheries.
crop losses is estimated at 118 billion Pakistani rupees (PKR) ($1.4 billion). Using the 
median crop land productivity by province as a base (which effectively gives less weight to 
the highest-productivity farms), the estimated loss is 101 billion PKR ($1.2 billion). 
Alternatively, a 50 percent crop loss would imply losses of 294 billion PKR ($3.5 billion) 
based on mean land productivity and 251 billion PKR ($3.0 billion) based on median land 
productivity. These latter figures for yield losses are slightly higher than the NRD-PARC 
estimate of $2.15 billion released mid-October, but significantly lower compared to the $5 
billion crop losses estimated by the WB/ADB/FAO (Table 3). 
Reduction in agricultural incomes will likely lead to lower spending on rural non-
farm goods and services (processing, marketing, rural services, and so on), and thus reduce 
rural non-farm incomes as well. These multiplier effects can be quite large, equivalent to an 
6
extra 1.5 PKR of lost non-farm income for a 1 PKR loss in crop incomes.  Further, a 
significant wheat supply reduction (and increase in the wheat price) would have major 
adverse effects on most Pakistani households. Wheat accounts for 23.0 percent of food 
expenditures for the poorest 20 percent of households in both urban and rural areas, and 14.9 
percent of food expenditures nationally for all household groups (127 PKR/person/month 
6
Dorosh, Niazi, and Nazli (2003). 
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out of a total food expenditure of 850PKR/person/month; Table 5). In quantity terms, wheat 
and wheat flour consumption is about eight times larger than rice consumption nationally 
(7.8 kilograms/person/month for wheat and wheat flour, compared with 0.9 
kilograms/person/month for rice; Table 6). A reliance on wheat as the major staple food is 
especially great for rural households, particularly the rural poor, for whom wheat 
consumption (7.2 kilograms/person/month) is about 10 times greater than rice consumption 
(0.7 kilograms/person/month). As discussed below, changes in trade policy could help 
stabilise wheat prices in the event of a major wheat production loss.
Livestock loss data are currently unavailable for Punjab, but estimated livestock 
losses in Sindh and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa are available and are equivalent to 42 percent of 
crop losses (Table 2). Assuming the national average of livestock losses for all affected areas 
in Pakistan (including Punjab) is equal to 40 percent of crop losses gives a livestock loss of 
74.3 billion PKR ($870 million). Alternatively, using the HIES-derived estimates, if the 
livestock loss is 40 percent of crop loss, the estimates range from 40 to 188 billion PKR 
($0.47 billion to $1.38 billion). Total agricultural loss would then be 141 to 352 billion PKR 
($1.7 billion to $4.8 billion).
3. RESPONDING TO NATURAL DISASTERS IN 
In recent years, there has been a gradual shift away from dealing with floods as stand-
alone events to managing the recovery and rehabilitation efforts as part of a multisector 
development approach. Increasingly greater attention is being placed on mitigation, 
preparedness, and socioeconomic and political factors [PAHO (2000)]. There is a growing 
consensus that the flood policy context must include multidisciplinary, multisector, 
multistakeholder participation as well as initiatives to address the flood environment 
characterised by the transboundary nature and influences of an integrated water system 
[ADPC/UNDP (2005)]. The experience of recovery from previous major natural disasters in 
Pakistan and throughout South Asia offers numerous lessons that may be relevant for post-
2010 Pakistan flood rehabilitation and recovery efforts.
The discussion below groups these lessons in four major categories: market and trade 
policies; institutional framework and sources of financing; livelihood support programmes 
and welfare transfers; and rehabilitation of agriculture and infrastructure. Many of the 
lessons derive from the disaster recovery efforts after the 2005 earthquake in Pakistan and 
the 1998 flood in Bangladesh, a flood of comparable extent and duration to the present 
7
Pakistan flood.  
Market and Trade Policies
Immediately following a major natural disaster, there are often major disruptions to 
roads, port facilities, transport services, physical market structures, and both internal and 
external trade flows. Households that lost livelihoods face serious problems related to lack of 
access to food, safe drinking water, and proper sanitation facilities. In the relief operations 
immediately after the disaster strikes, government agencies, international agencies, and 
SOUTH ASIA 
7
In 1998, Bangladesh suffered a major flood in which, at its peak in early September, floodwaters covered 
two-thirds of the country. More than 20 percent of the monsoon season (aman) rice crop was destroyed (more than 2 
million tons of rice), road infrastructure was badly damaged, and many landless rural poor households suffered 
losses of wages [Dorosh (2001)]. There are, of course, major differences between the 1998 Bangladesh floods and 
the 2010 Pakistan floods, including the much greater damage to irrigation infrastructure in Pakistan and the 
substantially larger safety net system already in existence in Bangladesh at the time of the 1998 floods.
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Table 5
Food Expenditures (PKR/Capita/Month): 
Pakistan HIES 2007-08, by Total Expenditure Quintiles
Pakistan
  Total 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 
 
Wheat 127 110 125 132 135 132 
Rice 36 21 29 32 41 57 
Other Cereals 3 1 2 3 4 5 
Pulses 20 13 17 19 23 28 
Fruits (Fresh and Dried) 32 9 16 24 35 78 
Vegetables  67 45 55 65 75 97 
Milk and Dairy 213 92 142 184 249 398 
Meat Poultry and Fish 47 17 28 37 48 104 
Fish 6 3 4 5 5 12 
Edible Oils and Fats  99 66 81 94 113 140 
All Food Items 850 483 642 768 941 1,414 
Urban Pakistan
 
Wheat 113 104 110 113 115 115 
Rice 39 19 25 31 40 57 
Other Cereals 3 1 2 2 3 5 
Pulses 21 13 17 18 22 26 
Fruits (Fresh and Dried) 44 10 17 25 36 83 
Vegetables  73 45 55 62 72 97 
Milk and Dairy 226 85 124 162 215 359 
Meat Poultry and Fish 68 19 29 42 54 123 
Fish 9 2 4 5 6 17 
Edible Oils and Fats  101 63 77 89 102 130 
All Food Items 935 462 594 717 868 1,402 
Rural Pakistan 
Wheat 134 111 130 140 147 153 
Rice 35 21 31 32 42 58 
Other Cereals 3 1 2 3 5 5 
Pulses 19 13 17 20 24 30 
Fruits (Fresh and Dried) 26 9 15 23 35 71 
Vegetables  65 45 55 66 78 96 
Milk and Dairy 207 94 147 193 270 446 
Meat Poultry and Fish 37 17 27 35 45 81 
Fish 4 3 4 4 5 7 
Edible Oils and Fats  98 66 83 97 120 151 
All Food Items 808 488 658 789 986 1,429 
 Source: HIES (2008).
Note: Food categories total include “Other” food category.
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Table 6
Monthly per Capita Consumption (in Kilograms) of Major Cereal Groups by 
Total Expenditure Quintiles
Source: HIES (2008).
Major Cereal Items
Quintile
Total 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
Pakistan 
Wheat and Wheat Flour 7.8 7.1 7.7 8.0 8.1 7.9
Rice and Rice Flour 0.9
 
0.7
 
0.9 0.8 1.0 1.1
Pakistan Urban 
    
Wheat and Wheat Flour 6.5
 
6.3
 
6.4 6.6 6.6 6.5
Rice and Rice Flour 0.9 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.1
Pakistan Rural 
Wheat and Wheat Flour 8.4 7.2 8.1 8.6 9.0 9.5
Rice and Rice Flour 0.9 0.7 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.2
nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) may have to provide food, clothing, healthcare, and 
other goods and services. However, restoration of private trade (and even promotion of 
expansion of trade) can enhance both price stability and food security more effectively and at 
far less cost, particularly in the post-disaster rehabilitation phase, and also in the relief stage. 
Following the 1998 floods in Bangladesh that destroyed about 20 percent of the 
monsoon season rice crop, the Government of Bangladesh took steps to promote private-
sector imports to supplement its own commercial imports and food aid inflows. In particular, 
the government removed a 2.5 percent tariff on rice imports, expedited clearance of rice 
imports, and announced strict limits on government sales of subsidised rice. Moreover, past 
investments in roads and liberalisation of domestic and import trade in rice and wheat had 
helped make private markets more efficient and able to respond quickly to production 
shortfalls. Given these past investments and clear, transparent, and consistent policy with 
adequate price incentives at the time of the flood, private-sector imports exceeded 200,000 
metric tons per month for eight consecutive months, in spite of food aid wheat imports of 
more than 1 million metric tons and large-scale public foodgrain distribution [Dorosh 
(2001); del Ninno, et al. (2001); Dorosh, del Ninno, and Shahabuddin (2004)].
In Pakistan, by contrast, a combination of fluctuating prices in international markets 
and uncertainty regarding government policy has greatly limited private sector imports of 
wheat. Incentives for private-sector import (and export) trade in wheat shifted several times 
between June 2005 and June 2010. However, world prices fell sharply in October 2008, and 
from October 2008 to June 2010, domestic prices were above export parity prices; private-
sector exports were not profitable in this period. Instead of profitable opportunities for 
exports, the combination of the world price decline and an increase in Pakistan’s domestic 
price provided an opportunity for profitable imports as domestic prices were approximately 
equal to import parity from December 2008 to April 2009.
Private sector imports did not occur on a large scale, however, and from July 2009 
through June 2010, domestic prices were substantially above import parity. Although, there 
were substantial incentives for private-sector imports in this period, but private imports of 
wheat were minimal. Instead, the Trading Corporation of Pakistan imported wheat. Large 
domestic stocks (procurement exceeded releases by a combined 5.2 million metric tons in 
fiscal years 2008-09 and 2009-10) and lack of clarity about government interventions likely 
played a major role in discouraging private imports.
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World wheat prices increased 39 percent between June 2010 and August 2010 from 
$182.8/metric ton to $254.0/metric ton, due in large part to fire and smoke damage to 
Russia’s wheat crop and Russia’s ban on wheat exports. In spite of a recent increase in 
international wheat prices due to Russia’s wheat export restrictions, Pakistan’s wheat prices 
were still near import parity at the time of the 2010 floods (Figure 3). 
Fig. 3. Pakistan Domestic and International Wheat Prices, 2002–10
Thus, it was unclear whether or not the recent floods would have major effects on the 
wheat market. Kharif season rice and maize crops account for only a small share of cereals 
consumed in Pakistan, and a decline in their availability has relatively little effect on wheat 
demand or wheat prices. Depending on further developments in world wheat markets, the 
extent to which flood damage affects Pakistan’s 2010-11 harvest, and domestic wheat 
demand, private-sector wheat imports may provide a zero-fiscal-cost means of stabilising 
domestic wheat prices at an acceptable import parity level in the coming year.
Institutional Framework and Sources of Financing
In response to the October 2005 earthquake, the Pakistani government established 
the Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority (ERRA) with the specific 
mandate to carry out early recovery, reconstruction, and rehabilitation efforts in the affected 
areas. A major objective of the recovery and rehabilitation effort was to “build back better,” 
that is, not to simply restore infrastructure and services to pre-earthquake levels, but to avail 
of the opportunity to address previous shortcomings and establish improved facilities and 
services [ERRA (2010)]. The post-earthquake efforts demonstrated the need for a strong 
institutional framework to coordinate the large-scale disaster response, and they offer the 
2010 recovery and rehabilitation efforts a number of pertinent lessons. First, all phases of the 
disaster response should be handled by the same institution and all stakeholders should be 
included in the disaster response mechanism [ERRA (2010)]. Second, there is a need to 
account for long-, medium-, and short-term goals in the postdisaster response and to connect 
these goals together in one framework [ERRA (2010)]. Third, the participation of two key 
177
(U
S
$
/t
o
n
)
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
J
a
n
-0
2
J
u
l-
0
2
J
a
n
-0
3
J
u
l-
0
3
J
a
n
-0
4
J
u
l-
0
4
J
a
n
-0
5
J
u
l-
0
5
J
a
n
-0
6
J
u
l-
0
6
J
a
n
-0
7
J
u
l-
0
7
J
a
n
-0
8
J
u
l-
0
8
J
a
n
-0
9
J
u
l-
0
9
J
a
n
-1
0
J
u
l-
1
0
Lahore Wholesale Price Import Parity(Lahore) Export Parity Lahore
Rehabilitating Agriculture and Promoting Food Security After the 2010 Pakistan Floods
stakeholders, the government and the affected communities, must be ensured [ERRA 
(2010)]. Fourth, post-disaster improvement should not be confined to physical infrastructure 
and facilities but should include “soft” components as well, such as policy-making, 
planning, systems and procedures, human resource management, and so on [ERRA (2010)]. 
Fifth, capacity development has to be an integral and concurrent component of all 
reconstruction work. Finally, the recovery strategy should be monitored and evaluated and 
the findings fed back into the recovery process at all stages [ADPC/UNDP (2005)].
Given the Pakistani government’s limited resources and the urgency of the recovery 
efforts, the sources of financing and the speed at which required funds are delivered to 
stakeholders both play an important role in the success of the disaster recovery efforts. 
Previous flood rehabilitation projects demonstrated that financing rehabilitation costs under 
ongoing projects, rather than through a new, omnibus emergency project, is quicker and 
likely to be more flexible. This is because high start-up costs are involved in helping the 
government design a new project and high coordination costs are involved in ensuring that 
different government agencies and interests involved in such a project are properly aligned. 
Reprogramming already-existing projects is also more likely to ensure that the response to 
the floods will be better integrated in the country programme, will influence the design of 
future projects, and will avoid the tendency of emergency operations to be stand-alone, one-
off actions [World Bank (2000)]. However, it is important to include a plan that accounts for 
future replenishment of project funds, in order to avoid damaging the affected projects’ 
medium- and long-term goals.
Livelihood Support Programmes and Welfare Transfers
Donors and governments tend to focus on projects that rehabilitate major 
infrastructure. They put much less effort into understanding the impacts of disasters on 
livelihoods or investing in programmes to support recovery of livelihoods [ADPC/UNDP 
(2005)]. A second, livelihoods-focused, needs assessment may be useful at the start of the 
recovery phase in order to prioritise communitie’ and individuals’ needs. Such an assessment 
could also improve understanding of existing livelihoods in the post-flood environment 
[Beck (2005)]. Recovery efforts should include support for livelihood security programmes, 
and in the immediate aftermath of a natural disaster, a provision of compensation based on 
loss of livelihoods might be necessary to assist affected groups [ADPC/UNDP (2005)].
Well-targeted transfers can be effective in enhancing food security of poor 
households, particularly when using existing effective targeting mechanisms and 
distribution channels. Bangladesh successfully avoided a famine through a combination of 
effective immediate relief efforts and well-targeted public food distribution [del Ninno and 
Dorosh (2001)]. Following the Bangladesh flood of 1998, distribution of wheat through the 
targeted Vulnerable Group Feeding programme was greatly expanded. Survey evidence 
shows that selection of the most vulnerable rural households through village-level 
committees successfully targeted that programme to the poor [del Ninno and Dorosh 
(2001)]. As stated above, NGOs with an ongoing development programme are most likely to 
be effective in the recovery phase, as they are in a better place to effectively target poor 
households and support their livelihoods [Beck (2005)].
Panel survey analysis of flood-affected households in Bangladesh also indicates that, 
as a result of the flood, many poor households experienced a substantial increase in debt. 
Borrowing from private creditors was a major coping strategy for households that lost crops 
or employment opportunities. This coping strategy was effective in augmenting household 
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access to food and thereby limiting the decline in food consumption following the flood. 
However, many households carried debts equal to one month’s average expenditure more 
than one year after the floods had ended. This suggests the need for credit (or even cash 
transfers) to poor households in the aftermath of a flood or other natural disaster not only to 
enhance food security in the short run but also to avoid a long-term loss in household welfare 
[del Ninno, Dorosh, and Smith (2003)].
There are many ways to incorporate livelihood strategies into the recovery and 
reconstruction efforts [IDS (2010); ADPC/UNDP (2005)]. The following are a summary of 
lessons learned in this area:
– Social protection should be prioritised in a disaster response so that the most 
vulnerable groups are protected. Awareness-raising is an important component to 
ensure participation. 
– There must be active participation of key stakeholders from a multisector base as well 
as the community in the decisions made for each programme. Activities, where 
possible, should be linked with government, local enterprises, organisations, and 
industries.
– Intervention should be tailored to target specific needs of different groups.
– Efforts should be made to promote livelihood opportunities for people through 
provision of temporary work schemes such as debris clearance, construction, public 
awareness, project management and assessments. 
– Partnering with NGOs to provide sustainable livelihood support (provision of seeds 
and tools, animals, capacity building) should be a component of the recovery efforts 
as NGOs can play a big part in relief initiatives and microcrediting.
– Developing forums and focus groups for particular industries will enable them to 
pool resources, share equipment and experiences, and support each other as well as 
plan for the future. Institutions such as community funding schemes that can help 
people restart businesses should be considered.
– Loans from the government or private sector and government grants can be used to 
fill consumption shortfalls.
– Enhancing skills through training to supply more construction-sector artisans 
(masons, carpenters, electricians, etc.) and training them in hazard-resistant 
construction technology can upgrade the future workforce.
– Compensation should be paid to people without delay to enable them to rebuild their 
lives.
Rehabilitation of Agriculture and Infrastructure 
Reestablishing community access to necessary livelihood and infrastructure has been 
one of the first priorities of past recovery efforts. Given the large percentage of Pakistan’s 
population that is dependent on agriculture, the resumption of agricultural activities is vital 
for the country’s recovery and ability to sustain the flood damages. Several lessons drawn 
from previous experiences can inform postdisaster initiatives and hasten the speed of the 
restoration of agricultural production and solid infrastructure.
Restoration of Agricultural Activities
8
– Provision of seeds to smallholders can help these, and even “landless,”  households 
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8
Many households who are technically “landless” have small gardens.
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regain access to food and income-generating activities in the medium term [Beck 
(2005)].
– Likewise, replenishing the livestock assets, such as chickens and goats, of the poor 
can help them generate food and income in the medium term [Beck (2005)].
– Overall, rehabilitation of small-scale agricultural capital is essential. Temporary duty 
exemptions and other assistance can be critical to inducing renewed investments. For 
example, in Bangladesh, exempting imports of power tillers from duty in September 
1998 promoted a near tripling in imports, from 6,300 (September 2007 to March 
2008) to 17,500 (September 2008 to March 2009), as well as a change in technology 
9
that facilitated multiple cropping [Benson and Clay (2001); Beck (2005)].
– In addition, it will be advantageous to adapt farming techniques to the local 
environment by, for example, planting crops that are not at risk from seasonal 
flooding [ADPC/UNDP (2005)].
Restoration of Infrastructure
Evaluation of previously implemented post-disaster rehabilitation projects suggests 
the following [IDS (2010); ADPC/UNDP (2005); ADB (1996)]:
– Rapid initial economic assessment of individual subprojects of an emergency loan to 
determine priorities among subprojects and improve their scope and design is 
necessary. 
– The focus should be not only on restoring infrastructure facilities but also on 
upgrading them to enhance flood resistance.
– Projects continuous implementation needs to be accounted for by ensuring future 
upkeep of restored facilities, and transfer of management to local entities.
– The speed at which emergency projects have to be organised should not allow 
inclusion of unsustainable or economically or socially unjustifiable subprojects. 
– Accurate records of landownership and new infrastructure (roads, telecommunications, 
water supply systems, etc.) need to be maintained so as to provide a baseline for damage 
10
assessment in case future disaster strikes.
– There should be strict adherence to proper building codes in reconstruction; 
appropriate land use should be ensured; and in certain areas, disaster-proof 
construction techniques should be deployed so as to mitigate the impact of future 
disaster. This particularly applies to health and education facilities.
– Measures should be implemented to minimise loss of communications in the event of 
a disaster. For example, telecommunications equipment and essential facilities 
should be housed in prefab accommodation or quake-proof buildings; exchanges of 
9
In Pakistan, a small Agricultural Income Tax (AIT), equivalent to less than 0.2 percent of crop sector value 
added, is imposed on farmers based on area cultivated and type of crops grown. Charges for canal water (abiana) are 
also small, and do not cover operating and maintenance costs of the canals. Relief from these taxes may be of 
marginal help, but much more is required to compensate farmers who have lost crops and livestock. See Chaudhry 
(1999) and Kizilbash (2010).
10
The state of land records management in Pakistan raises concerns regarding the protection of property 
rights in the aftermath of the floods. In parts of northern Pakistan, land demarcations in rural areas have been washed 
away and in some places, paper-based land records and Board of Revenue office files may have been lost as well. 
Moreover, Pakistan’s laws relating to land and property are designed to collect revenues, rather than to guarantee 
title. Though all transactions are to be recorded under the law, none guarantee title, but only provide a presumed 
ownership [World Bank (2004)]. In this situation, there is the possibility of land-grabbing and corruption, and it is 
crucial that efforts are made to provide poor households with legal assistance to help them keep their land.
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major towns should be linked to a minimum of two media to provide fall-back 
options; fixed-line networks should be kept to a minimum with more use of Global 
System for Mobile Communications (GSM) and wireless local loop technologies.
– In rehabilitation efforts, provisions should be made to ensure effective 
communication between affected areas and those coordinating the disaster response: 
portable GSM setups should be maintained at the national level for speedy 
deployment in disaster zones; spare equipment such as switches, satellite phones, 
and microwave links should be readily available to support emergency rescue and 
relief efforts; in emergency conditions detailed documentation and everyday 
standard operating procedures should be relaxed to avoid unnecessary delays in 
relief operations.
– A cadre of engineers and other technical personnel should be identified and trained in 
disaster response operations such as road clearance, bridge reconstruction, and the 
provision of technical assistance to households’ reconstruction efforts to ensure 
safety standards.
– Contingency plans should be made for restoration of infrastructure, communications, 
and other services in the event of a disaster.
– Finally, an owner-driven approach to housing reconstruction is effective in allowing 
large-scale implementation.
4. TOWARDS DESIGNING OF A 2010 PAKISTAN FLOOD 
RESPONSE PROGRAMME
In this section, we discuss some of the key institutions that can play critical roles in 
the response to the 2010 floods; in addition, we address the implementation challenges that 
their efforts face.
Pakistan National Disaster Management Authorities
The 2010 Pakistan National Disaster Response Plan (NDRP) sets up national, 
provincial and district level disaster management authorities in order to serve as the 
implementing, coordinating and monitoring bodies for disaster management at their 
respective levels. In addition, the national and subnational authorities are responsible for 
preparing disaster management plans, at their respective levels, and for their implementation 
during impending disaster [Pakistan National Disaster Response Authority (2010)]. 
However, the subnational-level authorities do not yet exercise their functions, and need 
significant funding and capacity-building support to meet the roles and responsibilities 
outlined for them in the NDRP.  In addition, although efforts are to be coordinated among the 
national, provincial, and district levels, as we discuss later in this section, coordination 
among these levels of government can be problematic.
Public Institutions and Programmes
A range of institutions are involved in the flood recovery work. Of these, the two most 
prominent in terms of the nature of their mandate and the scale of their operations and 
geographic coverage are the Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund (PPAF) and the Benazir 
Income Support Programme (BISP). PPAF was set up by the Government of Pakistan with 
donor and government funding to act as an apex wholesaler and manager of funds to the 
NGO sector in the area of poverty reduction. BISP, the largest government safety net 
intervention in the country, was initially designed to provide financial support to old and 
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destitute women. The two together are considered by most decision makers to be the main 
vehicles for the delivery of flood recovery resources.
11
Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund 
Conceptually, the Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund is one possible vehicle for the 
delivery of poverty-alleviating interventions and resources. It adopts a participatory 
development model using social mobilisation, skill development, and capital accumulation 
as guiding principles. The model is community based and involves formation of groups or 
community organisations (COs) at the grass roots. It focuses on social organisation, creates 
awareness, and builds capacity. Under the PPAF model, communities organise themselves 
for establishing new groups and consolidating existing ones. The approach is demand-driven 
with high priority given to community-identified projects. Responsibility for operations and 
maintenance also falls on these groups. PPAF works through a network of NGOs or partner 
12
organisations (POs) that are committed to community-driven development.  Potential POs 
are required to undergo a rigorous selection process with both desk and field appraisals.  
Disbursements from and performance assessments by PPAF to selected partners take place 
on a quarterly basis. Compliance with implementation plans and adherence to contractual 
obligations are mandatory. The POs are generally expected to mobilise and train 
communities, act as intermediaries for microcredit loans, provide communities with health 
and education facilities as well as small-scale water and infrastructure projects, and assist 
communities in the preparation of feasible proposals and aid in their implementation; in 
addition, POs are responsible for supervising and monitoring PPAF projects.
Sponsored by the Government of Pakistan and funded by the World Bank and other 
leading donors, PPAF is currently working with 75 POs. It has a grassroots network of more 
than 130,000 COs and groups in 127 districts covering 30,000 villages, or nearly 70 percent 
of the villages in the country. PPAF programmes target poor rural and urban communities 
and place particular emphasis on gender and the empowerment of women. These 
characteristics position PPAF well for providing relief and rehabilitation in times of disaster. 
However, there has been no serious evaluation of the PPAF model over the more than 10 
years of its existence despite its having grown to become an organisation with a reported 
resource base of $1,062.79 million as of April 19, 2010 [PPAF (2010)].
While the absence of an in-depth evaluation of PPAF is a serious handicap, a number 
of factors lend support to using it as one of the major vehicles for flood relief and 
rehabilitation work, not the least of which is the absence of any other credible organisation 
with the reach and capacity to deliver in a timely manner. Those factors include the large 
network of POs directly working at the grassroots level, with footprints in 127 districts 
across Pakistan; the model of participatory grassroots development through which COs have 
formed over the past 10 years of PPAF operations; the capacity and experience of the PPAF 
POs in appraising community needs as a necessary component of all development 
interventions; and PPAF’s experience in relief activities, especially after the October 2005 
earthquake in Azad Jammu and Kashmir and North-West Frontier Province (now Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa).
PPAF’s experience in the 2005 earthquake, particularly in the relief phase, could 
prove useful in terms of ensuring the formation of an efficient logistical and operational 
11
This section is based on PPAF’s Annual Report 2009 [PPAF (2010)] and personal interviews with PPAF 
staff. http://www.ppaf.org.pk/db/PPAF%20ANNUAL%20REPORT%202009.pdf
12
The National Rural Support Programme (NRSP) is one of the larger partner organisations of the PPAF.
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edifice to provide planned relief activities to address the 2010 flood situation. PPAF has 
valuable experience in terms of networking with other governmental agencies and NGOs, 
including the armed forces, multilateral and bilateral donors, and specialised agencies.
PPAF can leverage these advantages. However, a number of factors need to be 
considered. First, there are significant gaps in the effective coverage of the PPAF POs at the 
grass roots. Overall coverage can be claimed in perhaps only a few districts. While the extent 
of coverage is difficult to assess, the PPAF POs do have a presence in the most affected areas. 
Second, the capacity and quality of COs through which the POs work also vary by region and 
type of interventions. Therefore, even where a large number of union councils are covered in 
a particular district, the quality of coverage varies with the type of PO (rural support 
programme, NGO, or microfinance institution), their maturity, and the duration of their 
partnership with PPAF, as well as with their overarching goals, mode of operations, and 
types of services delivered (whether infrastructure, health and education, microcredit, or any 
combination of these). It is important to note that PPAF at the implementation level is really 
the COs that its POs have set up. Third, the floods will likely diminish the capacity of the COs 
to be effective. Therefore, one must ascertain how many PPAF COs are presently active. 
Insofar as floods have destroyed infrastructure and displaced populations, the potential 
capacity of COs in the affected areas might have been badly affected.
Despite the above qualifiers, PPAF’s strengths position the institution to contribute in 
the national flood relief effort. This is manifested by its quick response in terms of resource 
mobilisation, networking with other partners (chiefly the army and the National Disaster 
Management Authority [NDMA]), and efficient strategising for provisioning relief goods 
and medical services.
Benazir Income Support Fund
In a meeting on August 27, 2010, the president of Pakistan directed that the 
partnership between BISP and NADRA (the National Database and Registration Authority) 
being used in the ongoing income support programme be used in a similar manner to provide 
necessary financial support to flood victims in various parts of the country. Under BISP, 
income support of 1,000 PKR per month is provided to deserving destitute women on the 
basis of verification of the computerised national identity card (CNIC) by the postal system 
and the banks. Under the president’s flood relief directive to BISP and NADRA, the 
13
government intends to award 20,000 PKR ($232 dollars)  to each flood-affected family as 
compensation for their losses. The money will also be used to repair damages to their homes. 
The first installment of 5,000 PKR ($58) was to be disbursed before Eid ul Fitr (the Muslim 
holiday that marks the end of the fasting month of Ramadan), around September 10, 2010.
In order to meet the presidential directive, these agencies will have to surmount two 
obstacles. First, the task of registering the population affected by the floods is huge. 
Currently the task of registering the flood victims rests with the provincial governments. A 
large number of people are being registered at the flood relief camps established by the army 
and the government. However, an equally large number of people have not been able to reach 
the camps or have been denied space in them due to overcrowding. Second, initial reports in 
the newspapers indicate that a large percentage of persons affected by the floods do not 
possess CNIC cards. They were either not registered or have lost their cards along with their 
13
1 US dollar is equal to 86.2 Pakistan rupees.
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belongings in the flood. If the verification procedure through NADRA is similar to the 
procedure of BISP, the victims who do not possess a CNIC will be excluded. Unfortunately, 
the families who do not possess the CNIC are the poorest of the poor. As it waits for the listing 
of the flood victims, BISP is initiating support to the existing flood-affected beneficiaries of 
BISP by providing them the announced flood relief assistance of up to 20,000 PKR. They 
propose to expand this operation as the verified database becomes available.
Therefore, for the programme to function, priority needs to be given to the 
comprehensive listing of all flood victims. This listing exercise should be expanded to elicit 
basic socioeconomic information that can be used as a baseline to monitor the relief and 
rehabilitation effort.
Implementation Challenges
The above discussion of the institutions that are likely to be active in flood relief and 
rehabilitation has indicated some of the specific challenges that arise. In this subsection, we 
extend and generalise this discussion.
Difficulties of Flood Damage Restoration Projects
The internal rates of return for previous Pakistan flood damage restoration projects 
involving irrigation and other infrastructure investments, estimated by the Asian 
Development Bank have generally been low. Several lessons from the 1989-to-1993 
Pakistan Flood Damage Restoration Project may help Pakistan avoid low rates of return on 
such projects in response to the 2010 flood. In particular, a rush to implement the 1989–993 
project led to the inclusion of some unsustainable or economically/socially unjustifiable 
subprojects and to inefficient fund distribution. A clear set of criteria for subprojects in 
current rehabilitation efforts can help avoid the problem of poor subproject selection. 
Channeling disaster recovery funds through existing projects can result in faster and more 
flexible response. 
Moreover, beneficiaries were not consulted in any stage of the 1989–1993 project. 
There were no special efforts to promote employment of local people during implementation 
or arrangements for organising them for maintaining the restored facilities. Greater 
involvement of local people in design of subprojects and in their implementation and 
maintenance needs to be given priority. A long-term perspective to investment planning is 
also needed so as to build infrastructure and drainage systems that can minimise damage 
from future floods.
Lack of Coordination between the  Federal and Provincial Authorities
There has traditionally been a lack of coordination among institutions at the federal 
and provincial government levels in Pakistan. This has been evident historically in the 
sharing of federal revenues as well as the successive and long drawn out deliberations around 
the provincial finance awards, the issues around the sharing of the waters from the Indus 
River basin, and the lack of agreement on constructing the Kalabagh and other dams. 
Moreover, based on the experience following the earthquake of 2005 and evaluation of the 
earthquake response preparedness [Buttenheim (2009)], the provincial authorities have no 
or very little preparation to respond to the situation and are dependent on assistance from the 
armed forces and the federal government agencies. The National Disaster Risk Mitigation 
Plan indicates establishment of Provincial Disaster Management Authorities, but this plan 
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has yet to materialise. Apart from the province of Punjab, which has set up some mechanisms 
of disaster mitigation (in the form of the emergency telephone number, rescue 1122), the 
other provinces were unprepared to respond to the destruction brought by the floods. There is 
little proactive planning and timely access to early warning. In addition, there is an 
increasing lack of confidence and trust between the provinces. The provinces have already 
started showing their discontent over the distribution of funds as there is increasing demand 
from provinces, reported in the national newspapers, that the funds should be directly given 
to the provinces instead of being routed through the federal government.
Rapid Damage Assessment
Experience suggests that a realistic assessment of the damage is needed after the 
floodwaters recede. Relief efforts will need to address the myriad issues of displacement, the 
lack of food and healthcare, and the economic crisis that the entire country will be facing. 
These losses will escalate if not addressed quickly. In that light, it is imperative that damage 
assessments be conducted quickly and in a manner that builds ownership among the key 
stakeholders so that findings can be addressed effectively.
Channelling Funds
There is growing concern among the national and international community involved 
with the flood relief efforts about channeling funds for relief and rehabilitation in the most 
effective way. The United Nations and other key donors work directly as well as through the 
government (NDMA) and national and international NGOs. The World Bank and Asian 
Development Bank traditionally channel their resources through government ministries and 
line departments. While it is too early to assess in this case, the experience of the October 
2005 earthquake suggests that there is a need for a central pool of resources, administered by 
the government with representation from donors, semi-autonomous bodies (e.g., PPAF, rural 
support programmes, and so on), and the civil society, who should work in coordination to 
formulate and implement strategies for use of the funds and monitoring of progress. All 
funds should be subject to third-party audits to ensure transparency of the process.
Political Inconsistency
Backsliding on commitments or being inconsistent between policy and action can be 
a serious constraint on the effectiveness of any relief and rehabilitation measure. This 
historical issue of inconsistency between policy and implementation can pose serious 
challenges during the current crisis. The present government’s low level of ownership for the 
NDMA set up by the previous government is a case in point. The prime minister has 
expressed dissatisfaction in his public statements over the performance of NDMA and has 
recently announced establishing a parallel body called the National Disaster Management 
Committee with the same role and responsibilities as NDMA. This act is likely to have many 
implications in terms of duplication of activities, lower ownership on the part of both bodies, 
and confusion among the donors. Any such actions at this point can compromise the 
effectiveness of relief and rehabilitation efforts.
Capacity and Delivery Issues
Despite the several weeks’ warning downstream areas had after the floods struck the 
northern areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the provinces were ill equipped to protect the 
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population with the basic necessities like shelter and food. Several weeks after the floods, the 
lack of transportation facilities, sufficient supplies like tents, and knowledge and 
information about disaster mitigation continued to be major constraints. 
Disaster response employs multiple disciplines, such as developing competent in-
country education programmes aligned with internationally accepted standards [NDMA 
(2010)]. Operational contingency planning must, therefore, be refined in disaster-vulnerable 
districts. Disaster response agencies have their strengths and weaknesses. In disaster-prone 
countries like Pakistan, it is imperative to develop basic disaster risk mitigation knowledge 
and skills not only among the policy-makers and implementation groups but also among 
members of the at-risk communities. 
Enhancement such knowledge and skills among the current generation’s students is 
also pertinent in enabling future generations to deal with disaster risk problems [NDMA 
(2010)]. Training and education should involve orientation about disaster risks and 
vulnerabilities, skill development on risk assessment, vulnerability reduction, hazard 
mitigation, and emergency response management [NDMA (2010)]. Specialised training in 
areas of response, such as search and rescue, first aid, fire fighting, evacuation, camp 
management, and relief distribution will also be necessary [NDMA (2010)]. Considering the 
importance of media, NDMA and the provincial disaster management authorities need to 
establish partnerships with electronic and print media and develop awareness of media 
personnel.
Lack of Early Warning Systems
Pakistan needs to establish and strengthen early warning system mechanisms to 
ensure appropriate responses to recurring natural disasters like the recent flood. This will 
include bringing together the latest technologies that provide early warnings (these already 
exist within Pakistan’s national space research agency, the Space and Upper Atmosphere 
Research Commission) and acquiring adequate scientific training to monitor such situations 
and disseminate timely information so that hazards can be met with preparation. Such 
systems have the potential to contribute significantly to reduce disaster losses.
Mainstreaming Concerns for Women and Children
Initial reports in the national newspapers indicate that women and children were the 
worst affected demographic during the recent floods in Pakistan. Traditionally, the needs of 
this most vulnerable section of society are overlooked in countries like Pakistan. Ignoring 
gender aspects in disaster response, recovery, and preparedness is likely to result in 
worsening existing poverty and inequality levels. It is imperative that the assessments and 
the programs developed for rehabilitation of flood victims are gender sensitive and aim at de-
intensifying the existing political, social, and economic inequalities faced by women 
[NDMA (2010)]. In spite of the devastation that they cause, natural disasters provide 
opportunities for social and economic change. Women can be empowered as equal 
stakeholders to act as key resources before, during, and after disasters to reduce deaths, 
restore the household economy, and reduce the breakdown of social safety nets.
5. CONCLUSION
The experience of recovery from previous natural disasters in Pakistan and 
throughout South Asia offers numerous insights and lessons that may be applicable to the 
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post-2010 Pakistan flood rehabilitation and recovery efforts. We have grouped these lessons 
into four broad categories: market and trade policies; institutional framework and sources of 
financing; livelihood support programmes and welfare transfers; and rehabilitation of 
agriculture and infrastructure.
Under clear, transparent, and consistent policy with adequate price incentives, 
private trade and imports can substantially contribute to the country’s postdisaster recovery. 
Restoration of private trade (and even promotion of expansion of trade) can enhance both 
price stability and food security. It can do so more effectively and at far less cost than 
government-led or international organisation-led efforts, particularly in the post-disaster 
rehabilitation phase.
There is a need for a strong institutional framework to coordinate the large-scale 
disaster response. Long-term and short-term goals need to be accounted for and integrated 
into this comprehensive post-disaster response framework. Involvement of all affected 
stakeholders in the policy formulation is important to ensure representation and 
participation. The experience in Bangladesh suggests that financing of recovery efforts 
through existing projects and delivery mechanisms enables a faster and more flexible 
response.
Recovery efforts should include support for livelihood security programmes. In the 
immediate aftermath of the floods, a provision of compensation based on loss of livelihoods 
might be necessary to assist affected groups. Stakeholders and vulnerable groups should be 
included in the recovery efforts in a variety of ways ranging from participation in the 
rehabilitation plan formulation to inclusion in temporary work schemes related to the relief 
and reconstruction efforts. Alternative strategies for the poor to cope with loss of income 
need to be examined in order to avoid high and unsustainable indebtedness of households, 
resulting from the flooding.
There are opportunities for not only restoring infrastructure facilities but also 
upgrading them to enhance flood resistance. In addition, the rapid resumption of normal 
agricultural activities is vital for the country’s recovery. Therefore, provision of inputs to 
affected smallholders is essential.
Finally, it is important to establish and strengthen disaster response capability so that 
the country can better respond to recurring natural disasters. Emergency early warning 
system mechanisms have the potential to substantially reduce casualties and economic 
losses from disasters, and they need to be strengthened. Likewise, the lessons learned from 
the relief and rehabilitation response to the 2010 floods should be incorporated in 
contingency plans for future natural disasters.
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